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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case, This is a civil case for conver-
sion and for breach of contract. 
B. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below. Plain-
tiff filed its Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County on July 31, 1985. (R. 5-11.) By stipulation 
of the parties, venue of the case was transferred to the Second 
Judicial District Court of Davis County. (R. 2-4.) Plaintiff 
filed an Amended Complaint on August 15, 1986. (R. 85-94.) The 
defendants each filed answers to the Amended Complaint. 
(Smedley, R. 95-101; First National Bank of Layton, R. 102-07.) 
On May 23, 1986, plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment (R. 51-52), and on March 23, 1987, filed a Review-
ed [sic: Renewed] and Amended Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. (R. 113-14.) The Court thereafter entered an Order 
determining that Smedley, who had made a bid on the subject 
property at a sale held by the bank, had thereby only redeemed 
the property as a secured party and did not take pursuant to 
that sale, and that Smedley's acquisition of the collateral did 
not destroy the ownership interest of the plaintiff. The court 
otherwise denied plaintiff's motions for summary judgment. (R. 
174-75; 177-80.) 
The case was tried before a jury on March 30, April 1, and 
April 4, 1988. At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a 
verdict, a copy of which is attached hereto in Appendix A, 
awarding damages in favor of plaintiff and against Smedley and 
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the bank for $586.00, and against Smedley only for $30,586.00. 
(R. 439-41.) A Judgment on Verdict was entered on April 18, 
1988. (R. 442-44.) 
On the same day the Judgment on Verdict was entered, 
plaintiff filed a Motion for Judgment N.O.V. (R. 429-31), a 
Motion for Judgment and Interest (R. 432-33), a Motion for 
Attorney's Fees and Costs (R. 434-35), and a Motion for a New 
Trial or for an Additur. (R. 436-38.) After hearing, the court 
augmented the judgment in the amount of $2 50.00, granted 
plaintiff pre-judgment interest, costs, and attorney's fees 
against Smedley, and otherwise denied plaintiff's motions. (R. 
486-88.) An Amended Judgment on the Verdict reflecting the 
disposition of plaintiff's post-trial motions was entered on 
June 23, 1988. (R. 483-85.) Plaintiff filed its Notice of 
Appeal on July 12, 1988. (R. 490-91.) 
C. Statement Of Facts. The dispute in this case centers 
around a 1973 Chicago pneumatic drill rig mounted on a 1973 
International truck ("drill rig"), which served as collateral 
for a promissory note executed by plaintiff in favor of General 
Electric Credit Corporation (HGECC,f) . Payment of the note was 
guaranteed by defendant Dale Smedley. (Plaintiff's Ex. 4.) 
The transactions that led to the signing of the promissory 
note started sometime prior to October, 1983. Smedley owned 
approximately 200 acres of land in Morgan County, Utah, subject 
to a mortgage in favor of GECC in the approximate amount of 
$112,500.00. Smedley and plaintiff entered into negotiations 
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under which the parties would form a joint venture with plain-
tiff infusing capital and the parties developing the property. 
(Plaintiff's Ex. 1.) The negotiations culminated in an agree-
ment dated June 8, 1984, under which plaintiff discharged 
Smedleyfs obligation to GECC by paying $100,000.00 cash to GECC 
and executing a promissory note for the balance due on the 
mortgage. (The promissory note was for $13,250.00.) The 
promissory note was secured by the drill rig and by the personal 
guarantee of Smedley. (Plaintiff's Ex. 2; R. 277-78.) Smedley 
executed a bill of sale to the drilling rig conveying title to 
the plaintiff. (Plaintiff's Ex. 3.) Smedley had the right to 
reacquire title to the drill rig by performing $65,000.00 worth 
of work towards developing the 200 acres of real property. (R. 
278; Plaintiff's Ex. 2.) Actual possession of the drill rig at 
all times remained with Smedley. (R. 201, 279.) 
The promissory note to GECC became due on January 1, 1985 
(Plaintiff's Ex. 4), and plaintiff did not make the payment. 
(R. 279.) Plaintiff demanded that Smedley deliver to it the rig 
and would have made payment to GECC if Smedley had released the 
rig. Smedley refused. Rather than release the rig to the 
plaintiff, Smedley induced the First National Bank of Layton 
("bank") to purchase the position of GECC in the promissory 
note, chattel mortgage and guaranty agreement. (R. 201-02; 
Defendant's Exs. 14, 15.) Smedley was indebted to the bank for 
an amount far in excess of the value of the drilling rig (R. 
202) and the bank stood to lose several hundred thousand 
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dollars, so Smedley and the bank developed a plan to obtain the 
equity in the drilling rig and apply it against Smedley*s loan 
with the bank. (R. 279.) The bank sent a notice to plaintiff 
of its intention to dispose of the drilling rig, and asserted in 
the notice that the amount necessary to redeem the collateral 
was the outstanding principal and interest, together with costs 
of repossession and sale and attorney's fees. (Plaintiff's Ex. 
7.) In response to the notice, plaintiff submitted a written 
tender offering to pay the amount of the principal and interest 
to redeem the collateral. (Plaintiff's Ex. 8.) The bank did 
not respond to the tender. (R. 202.) The bank proceeded with 
its sale, and at the sale Smedley redeemed the collateral for 
the amount demanded by the bank. (R. 175, 178, 202.) The bank 
did not cash Smedley's check to it for the GECC loan until after 
the check from Doxey, Smedley's purchaser, had cleared the bank 
some six days later. 
In accordance with his prior understanding with the bank, 
Smedley thereafter sold the drilling rig to a third party, 
Doxey, and paid the surplus proceeds from the sale to the bank 
for application against his outstanding indebtedness. (R. 203.) 
Neither Smedley nor the bank gave any notice to plaintiff prior 
to the sale by Smedley. (Id.) 
Plaintiff filed this action to recover damages for 
Smedley's and the bank's conversion of his property. (R. 85-94.) 
Smedley filed an answer raising several affirmative defenses and 
also claiming a right of offset for the work he had performed on 
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the 200 acres of property. (R. 106.) The bank filed an answer 
but did not assert a right to offset in its answer. (R. 95-
101.) The jury found that Smedley was indebted to the plaintiff 
in the amount of $65,000.00, less the amount of work he had 
performed in the amount of $20,139.00, and the amount he had 
paid the bank on the GECC loan, $14,275.00, for a net amount of 
$30,586.00. 
The jury also found that both the bank and Smedley had 
converted plaintiff's property. The jury had been instructed 
that the damages for conversion was the fair market value of the 
drill rig (R. 408) , which the parties had stipulated was 
$35,000.00. (R. 412.) The jury further found that Smedley had 
performed $2 0,139.00 worth of work on the 200 acres of property, 
and granted Smedley an offset for that amount and for the amount 
Smedley had paid to the bank on the GECC note. (R. 441.) The 
jury, however, also granted the bank an offset for the same 
amounts. (Id.; R. 483-85.) Plaintiff thereafter perfected this 
appeal. (R. 490-91.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The jury found that the bank had converted plaintiff's 
property, and had been instructed that the damages from the 
conversion was the stipulated fair market value of the drill 
rig, $35,000.00, less allowable offsets. The jury offset 
against that judgment, however, an indebtedness owed by plain-
tiff to another party. The offset was contrary to the jury 
instructions. In addition, the offset was contrary to law, 
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because offsets may only be allowed as between parties with a 
mutuality of obligation. 
The trial court also erred in failing to instruct the jury 
on the issue of punitive damages. The evidence presented to the 
jury established, and the jury found, that the bank and Smedley 
entered into a conspiracy to intentionally deprive plaintiff of 
the equity in his property. The conduct was wilful and mali-
cious, and an instruction on punitive damages should have been 
given. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JURY AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN ALLOWING THE BANK AN OFFSET FOR AN OBLIGATION 
OWED TO SMEDLEY ONLY. 
Plaintiff established at trial that the bank and Smedley 
had agreed and conspired between themselves to deprive plaintiff 
of its equity in the drilling rig and to apply that equity in 
partial satisfaction of Smedley's obligation to the bank. The 
jury found the facts as contended by plaintiff, and awarded a 
judgment against both Smedley and the bank for conversion. The 
jury had been instructed that the measure of damages for 
conversion was the fair market value of the drill rig 
($35,000.00), less allowable offsets. The jury allowed the bank 
an offset based on an obligation owed by plaintiff to Smedley. 
The allowance of this offset was contrary to the express 
instructions given to the jury, and also contrary to the 
established law concerning the subject. 
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A. The Jury Instructions Precluded Allowing an Offset to 
the Bank. 
The jury was presented with several different causes of 
action and measures of damages. The claims against Smedley 
resulted in two measures of damages. For the claims of conver-
sion and wrongful sale, the jury was instructed to award the 
fair market value of the drill rig ($35,000.00), less an offset 
of $14,274* for the money paid by Smedley to redeem the drill 
rig from the bank's foreclosure sale, and less an additional 
offset for the work performed by Smedley on the 200 acres, which 
the jury found to have a value of $20,139.00. (Instructions 24, 
25 (R. 408, 409).) For the claim of breach of contract, the 
jury was instructed to award plaintiff the contract amount of 
$65,000.00, less the same offsets. (Instruction 23 (R. 407).) 
The jury found for plaintiff on each of these claims, and 
awarded damages in accordance with the instructions. On the 
breach of contract claim, the jury awarded $65,000.00, less 
offsets of $14,275.00 and $20,139.00, for a net judgment on the 
breach of contract claim of $30,586.00. (R. 440.) On the 
conversion and wrongful sale claims, the jury awarded Smedley 
$35,000.00, less offsets of $14,375.00 and $20,139.00, for a net 
judgment on the conversion and wrongful sale claims of $586.00. 
(R. 439.) 
instructions 24 and 25 stated the offset for payments to 
the bank was to be $14,274.00. The jury allowed an offset of 
$14,275.00. Plaintiff has not claimed error in the $1.00 
increased offset. 
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The offset of $14,275 was reduced to $14,025.00 by the 
trial court in response to plaintiff's post-trial motions, 
apparently because the offset included $2 50.00 for costs of 
repossession claimed by the bank but which was not actually 
spent. 
A summary of the verdict calculations is presented in 
Appendix "D". 
The instructions to the jury regarding plaintiff's claims 
against the bank for conspiracy, conversion, and wrongful sale 
are set forth predominately in instructions 29, 30, 31, and 36a, 
copies of which are set forth in Appendix MC".2 The measure of 
damages against the bank was set forth in Instruction No. 31 as 
follows: 
In the event you find the bank has conspired 
with Smedley as heretofore instructed, you 
should also enter judgment against the bank 
for the amount of any judgment against 
Smedley for conversion or wrongful sale. 
The evident purpose of this instruction was to insure that 
the jury could not find Smedley and the bank each guilty of 
conversion, but find that plaintiff's damages as a result of the 
conversion by the bank was Mxf' dollars, while plaintiff's 
damages as a result of conversion by Smedley was f,y" dollars. 
The award of damages had to the same against each defendant. 
Other instructions permitted the jury to grant Smedley an 
offset for any amounts which plaintiff owed Smedley. (E.g., 
* A complete list of the substantive jury instructions 
(omitting the stock instructions) appears in Appendix ffE". 
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Instructions 24, 25 (R. 408-09).) No instruction, however, 
authorized any offset against the damages found against the 
bank. 
The jury apparently misunderstood Instruction No. 31 as 
requiring that the judgment against the bank be equal to the net 
judgment against Smedley. The instruction should properly be 
read as requiring that the judgment against the bank be equal to 
the judgment against Smedley before the allowance of the 
offsets. 
The case should be remanded to the trial court with 
instructions to enter judgment against the bank for the sum of 
$35,000.00, plus interest and costs. 
B. The Bank Was Not Entitled to an Offset Based on 
Smedley's Claims Against Plaintiff. 
The discussion above establishes that the jury was re-
quired, under the instructions given, to make an award against 
the bank for conversion and wrongful sale for $35,000.00, and 
that the bank was not entitled to the benefit of the offsets 
awarded to Smedley. If, however, the jury instructions are read 
as allowing the offsets to be credited against the judgment 
against the bank, those instructions were clearly erroneous for 
the reasons shown below. 
Offset is an equitable doctrine, allowed when two parties 
are each indebted to the other on separate claims, and where 
under the circumstances justice requires that the debts be 
offset and only the difference between the debts recovered. 
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International Equipment Service. Inc. v, Pocatello Industrial 
Park Co., 107 Idaho 1116, 695 P.2d 1255, 1258 (1985); 20 Am. 
Jur. 2d Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Offset § 7 (1965). Offset 
is only allowed, however, where there is a mutuality of obliga-
tion. First Security Bank of Utah v. Utah Turkey Growers, Inc., 
610 P.2d 329, 333 (Utah 1980). Stated another way, a party may 
not obtain the benefit of an offset unless that party could have 
maintained a direct action for the amount of the offset. Seal 
v. Tavco, Inc.. 116 Utah 2d 323, 400 P.2d 503, 505 (1965) 
("[A]llowance of damages on a counterclaim by way of offset is 
tantamount to a suit on such cause of action."); Occidental 
Chemical Co. v. Connor, 124 Ariz. 341, 604 P.2d 605, 607 (1979) 
("If one is not entitled to relief in a direct action, he is not 
entitled to assert an offset or counterclaim.11). 
In the instant case, the offset allowed to the bank was 
based on the amounts which plaintiff owed to Smedley for work 
Smedley had performed in development of the 200 acre parcel of 
property. The claim arose pursuant to a contract between 
plaintiff and Smedley. It is clear that the bank could not have 
maintained a direct action against plaintiff based on that 
contract. Where the bank could not have maintained a direct 
action against plaintiff, it follows that the bank is not 
entitled to the benefit of offset for that same obligation. 
As set forth above, the instructions to the jury did not 
allow the bank a right of offset for the obligations owed by 
plaintiff to Smedley. To the extent that the instructions can 
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be read as allowing such a right of offset, they are clearly 
erroneous. It is possible that the jury misunderstood the 
instructions. It is clear in any event, however, that the jury 
found that the bank had converted or wrongfully sold plaintiff's 
property valued at $35,000.00, but then allowed the bank an 
offset against that amount based on claims owed by plaintiff to 
Smedley. The allowance of the offsets was error, and the case 
should be remanded for entry of judgment against the bank in the 
amount of $35,000.00 plus interest and costs. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUCTION 
ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
Plaintiff's amended complaint prayed for an award of 
punitive damages (R. 94), and plaintiff requested that the jury 
be instructed concerning punitive damages. (R. 336-37.) The 
trial court denied plaintiff's requested instructions, and 
instructed the jury that no punitive damages could be awarded. 
(R. 417.) 
In order to give rise to punitive damages, a defendant's 
conduct must be both wilful and malicious. The defendant must 
have demonstrated a knowing and reckless disregard toward the 
rights of others. Johnson v. Rogers. 90 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 
(1988)(citations omitted). Plaintiff acknowledges that in order 
to recover punitive damages, it was required to show more than 
mere conversion. Amoss v. Broadbent, 30 Utah 165, 514 P.2d 1284 
(1973) . 
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In the instant case, however, the jury found that the bank 
had converted plaintiff*s property, in accordance with the 
following instruction: 
If you find for the plaintiff on either 
plaintiff's claim for conversion or wrongful 
sale, before you may find that the bank 
conspired with Smedley you must find that 
defendant Smedley and the bank entered into 
a mutual agreement expressly or impliedly to 
pursue a joint enterprise to convert the rig 
or to conduct a wrongful sale of the rig in 
which they both engaged. With both acting 
in pursuit of that common purpose, so that 
each is acting for both in furthering it. 
Jury Instruction 30 (R. 414). 
The jury found, therefore, that the bank intentionally 
entered into an agreement with Smedley for the express purpose 
of wrongfully depriving plaintiff of his equity in the property. 
This finding of conspiracy necessarily implies the type of 
deliberate action which the courts have held constitute wilful 
and malicious conduct. This is sufficient to support an award 
of punitive damages, and the jury should have been so in-
structed. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury instructions and the established case law prohibit 
an offset to the bank for amounts owed by plaintiff to Smedley. 
The entry of the judgment allowing such an offset was in error. 
This case should be remanded with instructions to enter a 
judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the First National 
Bank of Layton in the sum of $35,000.00, plus costs and interest 
as provided by law. 
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Plaintiff was entitled to an instruction on punitive 
damages, and the case should be remanded for a new trial only on 
the issue of punitive damages. 
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MARK VII FINANCIAL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. .
 t 
DALE SMEDLEY, and 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LAYTON, ] 
Defendants. ] 
\ Civil Action No. 
I VERDICT 
40864 
WE THE JURY empanelled in the above entitled matter 
Find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendants Smedley and the Bank and award damages as follows: 
Signed this M day of April, 1988. 
\~J2»M%.Q& 
Foreperson 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARK VII FINANCIAL, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
DALE SMEDLEY, and 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LAYTON, ] 
Defendants. 
1 Civil Action No. 
VERDICT 
40864 
WE THE JURY empaneled in the above entitled matter, 
Find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendant Smedley and award damages in the following sum: 
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Signed this M day of April, 1988. 
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Foreperson 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARK VII FINANCIAL CONSULTANTS 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE SMEDLEY and FIRST NATIONAL 
BANK OF LAYTON, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
ON THE VERDICT 
Civil No. 40864 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
The above-captioncd matter came on for its regularly scheduled trial beginning 
on March 30, 1988, continuing on April 1, and again continuing on April 4, 1988. The 
Hon. Rodney S. Page presided over the trial, and the matter was tried to a duly 
impaneled jury consisting of eight members. At the conclusion of the evidence, the 
jury was instructed on the law and thereafter, the jury received the arguments of 
counsel. The jury, through its foreperson, Michael S. Cole, returned its verdict and 
based upon said verdict, and with the amendments the Court has made by separate 
Order, the Court now makes and enters the following judgment on the verdict: 
r** 
UBGJX7 EN7EBE3 fltt.«* 
* & 
1. The defendants jointly converted the property of the plaintiff damaging 
the plaintiff as set forth hereafter. 
2. Damages were calculated against the bank and the defendant Smedley, 
jointly and severally, for conversion as follows: 
a. Value of property converted: $ 35,000.00; 
b. Monies owed on the property: ($14,025.00); 
c. Offset for work performed by Smedley: ($20,139.00); 
Total: $ 836.00. 
3. In addition, the jury found damages against defendant Dale Smedley for 
conversion in the sum of $30,836.00. 
4. The plaintiff is granted judgment against The First National Bank of 
Layton in the amount of $836.00 and interest in the amount of $247.32 and costs in the 
amount of $479.45. 
5. The plaintiff is granted judgment against Dale Smedley in the amount of 
$30,836.00, plus interest in the amount of $11,691.98, attorney's fees in the amount of 
$20,000.00, and costs in the amount of $479.45. 
DATED at Farmington, Utah, this 2 2 L . day of June, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
2 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to 
the following, postage prepaid, this / *** <jay
 0f j u n c < 1987. 
Scott Pierce 
Attorney at Law 
Kennecott Building #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84113 
David E. Bean 
Attorney at Law 
190 South Fort Lane #2 
Layton, UT 84041 
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APPENDIX "C" 
Selected Jury Instructions 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
If you find that defendant Smedley breached the 
contract to repay to the plaintiff the sum of $65,000 you 
should grant judgment in favor of plaintiff and against 
Smedley in the sum of $65,000 less the $14,274 defendant 
Smedley paid the bank less any offset you may find Smedley 
was entitled to under his claim against the plaintiff. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^M 
If you find that the defendant Smedley converted 
an interest in property belonging to the plaintiff, you should 
award damages to the plaintiff equal to the fair market value 
at the time of the conversion less the $14,274 Smedley paid 
the bank and less any offset you may award Smedley on his 
claim against the plaintiff. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
If you find that defendant Smedley sold the rig 
to Doxey in violation of Utah Law, then you should award to 
plaintiff judgment against defendant Smedley equal to the 
market value of the rig at the time of sale less the $14,274 
Smedley paid the bank and less any offset you may award 
Smedley on his claim against plaintiff. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1<] 
You are instructed that the Court has determined as 
a matter of law that the bank did not conduct a private sale, 
but rather, the action of Smedley in purchasing the drill rig 
on April 29, 1985, was a redemption that did not cut off the 
rights of Mark VII. You are, therefore, instructed that if you 
find that the bank at the time of the receipt of the money from 
Doxey, May 3, 1985, knew that Smedley had redeemed as guarantor, 
knew that he did not have a right to sell the rig so as to 
extinguish the interest of Mark VII and retain the proceeds. 
Then the act of the bank in taking Doxey1s money and crediting 
the account of Smedley was an act of conversion of the property 
interest of Mark VII. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3^ 
If you find for the plaintiff on either plaintiff's 
claim for conversion or wrongful sale, before you may find that 
the bank conspired with Smedley you must find that defendant 
Smedley and the bank entered into a mutual agreement expressly 
or impliedly to pursue a joint enterprise to convert the rig 
or to conduct a wrongful sale of the rig in which they both 
engaged. With both acting in pursuit of that common purpose, 
so that each is acting for both in furthering it. 
The plaintiff must prove this proposition be a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. Q\ 
In the event you find the bank has conspired with 
Smedley as heretofore instructed, you should also enter judgment 
against the bank for the amount of any judgment against Smedley 
for conversion or wrongful sale. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3Uk 
You are instructed that you may find in favor of the 
plaintiff and against the defendant Smedley and reach a verdict 
consistant with these instructions. You may also find in favor 
of the plaintiff and against both defendants consistent with 
these instructions so as to return two consistent verdicts in 
favor of the plaintiff, however, if you find against Smedley in 
both instances the amount of the joint verdict against both 
Smedley and the Bank will be deducted by the Court from the 
amount you award in the verdict form against Smedley alone so as 
to prevent a double recovery. 
Nothing contained herein requires that you do either or 
both and you are instructed that you are free to return a verdict 
as you see fit based upon the evidence and facts as you find them 
under the law. 
APPENDIX "DM 
Summary of Verdict Calculations 
SUMMARY OF VERDICT CALCULATIONS 
Award per 
jury verdict 
Against Dale Smcdlev 
Breach of Contract (Jury Instruction 23) l 
Debt owed by Smcdley to Mark VII 
Less: improvements to land 
payment to Bank 
Subtotal for breach of contract 
Plus: interest 
attorney's fees 
costs 
Total for breach of contract 
$65,000.00 
20,139.00 
14,025.002 
$30,836.00 
11,691.98 
20,000.00 
479.45 
$63,007.43 
Correct 
Award per 
Appellant 
$65,000.00 
20,139.00 
14,025.00 
$30,836.00 
11,691.98 
20,000.00 
479.45 
$63,007.43 
Conversion or Wrongful Sale 
(Jury Instructions 24 & 25) 
Value of property (Jury Instruction 28) 
Less: improvements to land 
payment to Bank 
Total for conversion 
Against First National Bank of Lavton 
Conversion or Wrongful Sale 
(Jury Instructions 24 & 25) 
Value of property (Jury Instruction 28) 
Less: improvements to land 
payment to Bank 
Total for conversion 
$35,000.00 
20,139.00 
14,025.002 
$ 836.00 
$35,000.00 
20,139.00 
14,025.00 
$ 836.00 
plus punitive 
damages 
$35,000.00 
20,139.00 
14.025.002 
$ 836.00 
$35,000.00 
-0-
-0-
$35,000.00 
plus punitive 
damages 
*Thc judgment for breach of contract is inclusive of the judgment for conversion 
except for the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. 
2The jury allowed an offset of $14,275.00. The offset was reduced to $14,025.00 
by the trial court in response to plaintiff's post-trial motions. 
APPENDIX "E" 
List of Substantive Jury Instructions 
LIST OF SUBSTANTIVE JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
14. Claims of the parties 
15. Written agreements are ambiguous 
15a. Ambiguity construed against drafter 
16. Elements of breach of contract claim against Smedley 
17. Elements of conversion 
18. Smedley redeemed rig from Bank 
19. Requirements of commercially reasonable sale 
20. Elements of wrongful sale claim against Smedley 
21. Elements of Smedleyfs breach of agreement claim against 
plaintiff 
22. Smedley entitled to reasonable value of services 
23. Measure of damages for breach of contract against Smedley 
24. Measure of damages for conversion against Smedley 
25. Measure of damages for wrongful sale against Smedley 
26. Waiver and relinquishment defined 
27. Plaintiff had no duty to attend bank's sale 
28. Fair market value of rig was $33,000 plus $2,000 for hammer 
29. Elements of conversion against bank 
30. Elements of conspiracy against bank 
31. Measure of damages against bank (conspiracy to convert) 
3 6a. Effect of verdicts against both bank and Smedley (double recovery) 
